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ARTICLES
AIDS AND THE PERCEPTION OF AIDS AS HANDICAPS
UNDER FLORIDA LAWt
ROBERT CRAIG WATERS
Until 1989, many questions remained unanswered about the extent of
protection afforded by Florida's numerous handicap discrimination
laws for those with symptomless infection of the AIDS virus or those
perceived as having such an infection. The 1989 Florida Legislature
settled these questions by declaring that having the infection and
being perceived as infected fall within the protection of these
statutes. As a rationale, the Legislature adopted an express statement
of intent that found all forms of AIDS-related discrimination
irrational, scientifically unfounded, and detrimental to society as a
whole. This Article explores the sweeping implications of these
legislative determinations.
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AIDS AND THE PERCEPTION OF AIDS AS HANDICAPS
UNDER FLORIDA LAW
ROBERT CRAIG WATERS*
F ACED WITH a rapidly rising number of AIDS' cases2 and dis-
turbing evidence that the disease has spread deeply into the popu-
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the final editing of this Article.
1. "AIDS" means acquired immune deficiency syndrome, a usually fatal complex of op-
portunistic infections and malignancies caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). W.
MASTERS, V. JOHNSON & R. KOLODNY, CRISIS: HETEROSExUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AGE OF AIDS
179-84 (1988).
Although no cure for AIDS has been found, a number of new experimental therapies, drugs,
and vaccines are being tested. Mitsuya, Yarchoan & Broder, AIDS Therapies, Sci. AM., Oct.
1988, at 110; Matthews & Bolognesi, AIDS Vaccines, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 120.
For general information on the medical consequences of AIDS and HIV infection, see: R.C.
WATERS, AIDS AND FLORIDA LAW §§ 1.01-.10 (1989); D. SNOWDEN & D.F. CASSIDY EDS., AIDS:
A HANDBOOK FOR PROFESSIONALS (1989); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE AND NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, CON-FRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988 (1988) [hereinafter UPDATE 1988]; NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, AIDS, SExuAL BEHAVIOR & INTRAVENouS DRUG USE (1989); Redfield & Burke,
HIV Infection: The Clinical Picture, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 90; Weber & Weiss, HIV Infection:
The Cellular Picture, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 101.
2. By June 1, 1989, Florida had a cumulative 7,700 AIDS cases, compared to only 4,600
reported a year earlier on June 1, 1988. Compare FLA. DEP'T. OF HRS, ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFI-
CIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) SURVEILLANCE REPORT (June 1, 1989), at 2 with FLA. DEP'T. OF HRS
ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFIC1ENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) SURVEILLANCE REPORT (June 1, 1988), at 2. It
is estimated that Florida will have a cumulative 32,000 AIDS cases by 1991. Waters, Florida's
Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988, 16 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 441, 445 n.6 and accompanying text (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 AIDS Article] (quoting Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for
HC 88-07 (1988) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 13, 1988)).
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lation of South Florida,' the 1989 Florida Legislature revisited the
state's year-old Omnibus AIDS Act 4 and took several steps to extend
the protection it provides against AIDS-related discrimination.' The
most significant of these new enactments 6 consisted of a single sen-
tence:
Any person with or perceived as having acquired immune deficiency
syndrome, acquired immune deficiency syndrome related complex,
or human immunodeficiency virus shall have every protection made
available to handicapped persons.7
This simple declaration (hereinafter 1989 Enactment) thus equates
AIDS and its precursor infections, along with the mere perception
that a person has any of these illnesses or infections, with handicaps
already protected under Florida law.
The effect, however, is more far-reaching than first appears. Under
the 1989 Enactment, all other remedial statutes and regulations grant-
ing "protection" to the handicapped are incorporated by general
reference8 into this AIDS specific nondiscrimination provision. 9 The
3. On March 29, 1989, HRS released information showing widespread non-homosexual
transmission in South Florida of HIV, the agent responsible for AIDS. For instance, the statis-
tics for Palm Beach County showed that a total of 2501o of all cases were of heterosexual origin,
while 29076 were caused by intravenous drug use. Thus, 57% of all Palm Beach County cases
were spread through these two means alone. The corresponding figure in Dade County was 19%
heterosexual transmission, and 17% through intravenous drug use, for a total of 36%. In Bro-
ward County, 12% of AIDS cases were from heterosexual transmission, while 14% were from
intravenous drug use, for a total of 26%. FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES,
ADULT AIDS CASES AMONG NON HoMOsExuAL PERSONS (March 29, 1989) (available from depart-
ment). Nationally, only about 4% of all cases were caused by heterosexual transmission, while
about 20% were from intravenous drug abuse. Id. See generally Heyward & Curran, The Epide-
miology of AIDS in the U.S., Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 72; Mann, Chin, Piot & Quinn, The
International Epidemiology of AIDS, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 82.
4. Ch. 88-380, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996 (codified at scattered sections throughout FLA. STAT.
(1989)).
5. The nondiscrimination provisions adopted in 1988 are discussed extensively in the au-
thor's prior analyses of the subject and will not be treated in detail here. See R.C. WATERS,
supra note 1; 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2. The present Article is intended to build upon the
discussion contained in these prior publications by analyzing the impact of the 1989 legislation
on this field of law.
6. This Article will address only those aspects of AIDS-related legislation approved in 1989
that define AIDS-related infections and being perceived as infected as handicaps. A few other
provisions of the 1989 legislation concern other issues not related to discrimination. See ch. 89-
350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250-51 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 760.50(3)-.50(6) (1989)).
7. Id. at 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)).
8. The 1989 Enactment is a "reference statute." See State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227,
1229 (Fla. 1980); see also Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918); Jones v. Dexter, 8
Fla. 276 (1859), overruled on other grounds, Bushnell v. Denison, 13 Fla. 77 (1869).
9. See infra notes 102-223 and accompanying text, where this argument is fully developed.
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list of such remedial measures is extensive. It includes provisions for-
bidding discrimination against the handicapped in employment, 0
housing," the receipt and use of state-backed housing and loans, 2 ed-
ucation, 3 emergency medical treatment," insurance,"5 and the right to
be served alcoholic beverages. 16 Most significant of the prior handicap
laws, however, is the Florida Constitution's explicit guarantee of
equal protection and other basic rights for the handicapped. 7 By in-
corporating this guarantee, the 1989 Enactment elevates persons with
AIDS, or perceived as having AIDS, to the level of a highly protected
"suspect class" under state constitutional law.
This Article traces the limits of the 1989 Enactment by analyzing its
incorporation of handicap discrimination laws. 8 To provide a histori-
cal context, the Article first examines the development of AIDS-spe-
cific nondiscrimination law prior to the 1989 Enactment, including the
Most of these remedial statutes do not define the term "handicapped." The major exception is
the Florida Fair Housing Act. However, the Florida Fair Housing Act defines handicap in a way
that is consistent with the view that having AIDS and being perceived as having AIDS-related
infections are handicaps. See FLA. STAT. § 760.22(5) (1989).
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.10 (1989).
11. Id. §§ 760.20-.37.
12. Id. § 420.605(5)(i)] (1989); id. § 420.607(2)(g)1 (1987) (repealed by ch. 88-376, 1988 Fla.
Laws 1936, 1977).
13. Id. § 228.2001 (1989); see ch. 84-305, 1984 Fla. Laws 1435, 1439.
14. FLA. STAT. § 395.0142 (1989).
15. Id. §§ 627.644, .6615.
16. Id. § 562.51.
17. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
18. Space considerations will not permit an analysis in this Article of whether state regula-
tions are incorporated in the 1989 Enactment. Most of these regulations, however, are based on
statutes that themselves are incorporated into the 1989 Enactment. For discussions of other rele-
vant law on the subject of AIDS-related handicap discrimination, see W.F. BANTA, AIDS IN THE
WORKPLACE (1988); W.H. DORNETTE, AIDS AND THE LAW (1987); S.B. PUCKETT & A.R.
EMERY, MANAGING AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE (1988); R.C. WATERS, supra note 1; Carey & Ar-
thur, The Developing Law on AIDS in the Workplace, 46 MD. L. REV. 284 (1987); Leonard,
AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 HoFsTRA L. REV. 11 (1985); Rothstein, Children with
AIDS: A Need for a Clear Policy and Procedure for Public Education, 12 NOVA L. REV. 1259
(1988); Schulman, AIDS Discrimination: Its Nature, Meaning and Function, 12 NOVA L. REv.
1113 (1988); Schwarz & Schaffer, AIDS in the Classroom, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 163 (1985);
Wasson, AIDS Discrimination Under Federal, State, and Local Law After Arline, 15 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 221 (1987); 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2; Comment, Protecting Children with
AIDS Against Arbitrary Exclusion From School, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1373 (1986); Note, Asymp-
tomatic Infection with the AIDS Virus as a Handicap Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 563 (1988); Comment, Enforcing the Right to a Public Education for Children
Afflicted with AIDS, 36 EMORY L.J. 603 (1987); Comment, AIDS: Do Children with AIDS
Have a Right to Attend School?, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1041 (1986); Comment, Undoing a
Lesson of Fear in the Classroom: The Legal Recourse of AIDS-Linked Children, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1373 (1986); Comment, AIDS and Employment Discrimination Under the Federal Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973 and Virginia's Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 20 U. RICH. L. REV.
425 (1986).
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landmark Omnibus AIDS Act passed only a year earlier.' 9 Second, the
Article discusses the relevant legislative history underlying the 1989
Enactment and the explicit findings that accompany it. Third, the Ar-
ticle analyzes the most significant of the prior handicap discrimination
laws and the ways in which they now are incorporated into Florida's
AIDS-specific statutes. Finally, the Article discusses the remedies
available for AIDS-related handicap discrimination. The Article does
not attempt to address the incorporation of all laws dealing with the
handicapped.
I. FLORIDA AIDS DISCRIMINATION LAW PRIOR TO 1989
Before the 1988 Omnibus AIDS Act, Florida's AIDS-specific non-
discrimination law consisted entirely of a single administrative law or-
der, Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget and
Management Policy.20 In that decision, the executive director of the
Florida Commission on Human Relations (Human Relations Com-
mission) relied on the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 (Human
Rights Act)2' to declare that job-related discrimination against a per-
son with full-blown AIDS was unlawful. 22 This was so, according to
the order, because AIDS constitutes a handicap, and discrimination
against the handicapped by many employers23 is illegal under the Hu-
man Rights Act. 24
A. The Basis for the Shuttleworth Order
The Shuttleworth order based this conclusion on the "common us-
age" of the term "handicap," which it found to connote a condition
19. Ch. 88-380, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996 (codified at scattered sections throughout FLA. STAT
(1989)).
20. FCHR No. 85-0624 (Fla. Comm'n on Human Relations, Dec. 11, 1985); see also Shut-
tleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (federal lawsuit involving same
dispute).
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.10 (1989).
22. Shuttleworth, FCHR No. 85-0624, slip op. at 5-6.
23. The Human Rights Act applies only to those employers having 15 or more workers
during 20 or more weeks during the current or preceding calendar year. FLA. STAT. § 760.02(6)
(1989).
24. Shuttleworth, FCHR No. 85-0624, slip op. at 5-6. The Human Rights Act provides in
pertinent part:
(1) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's ... handicap ....
(b) To limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities,
or adversely affect any individual's status as an employee, because of such individual's
• . . handicap ....
FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1) (1989).
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that prevents normal functioning: "A person with a handicap does
not enjoy, in some manner, the full and normal use of his sensory,
mental or physical faculties." 25 The Human Relations Commission
consistently has declined to read the term "handicap" in a more tech-
nical sense. For example, the Commission has rejected 6 the detailed
and somewhat more limited definition of "handicap" provided in the
Florida Fair Housing Act (Fair Housing Act)2 7 and the one used in the
federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act).2 8
Thus, the Commission has leeway to develop its own working defini-
tion of "handicap" because the term is undefined in the Human
Rights Act itself. 29
This "common usage" approach to the definition of "handicap,"
however, left some doubt as to how far the Commission might go in
25. Shuttleworth, FCHR No. 85-0624, slip op. at 2 (quoting Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pac. R.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d 802, 809, 557 P.2d 307,
310 (1976)); accord Lanham v. Seamless Hosp. Prod., 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4703, 4705 (1986).
In Shuttleworth, the court simply used a dictionary definition of "handicap": "a disadvantage
that makes achievement unusually difficult; esp: a physical disability that limits the capacity to
work[.]" WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1027 (1961).
26. Lanham, 8 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. at 4705.
27. FLA. STAT. § 760.22(5) (1987). That statute declared that a handicap means:
(a) A person has a physical impairment which substantially limits one or more major
life activities, or he has a record of having, or is regarded as having, such physical
impairment; or
(b) A person is impaired by retardation, in that he has significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the period from conception to age 18; or a person has a develop-
mental disability as defined in s. 393.063(6). "Significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning," for the purpose of this definition, means performance which is
two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence
test. "Adaptive behavior," for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness
or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and
social responsibility expected of his age, cultural group, and community.
Id.
28. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(7)(8)(B) (West Supp. 1989). Prior to amendments in 1986 and 1988,
the term "handicapped individual" meant:
[A]ny person who (i) has a physical and mental impairment which substantially lim-
its one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impair-
ment, or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment. For the purposes of [the
operative nondiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act] as such sections re-
late to employment, such term does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or
drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from per-
forming the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such
current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the
safety of others.
Id. at 706 (7)(B) (West 1985).
29. See FLA. STAT. § 760.02 (1989) (definitional section of Human Rights Act fails to define
"handicap").
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dealing with the full array of potential AIDS-related discrimination. 0
Given the vagueness of the Commission's position, this question ap-
peared unanswerable prior to the Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988.1 I For
instance, it seemed likely that the diseases somewhat loosely described
as AIDS-Related Complex (ARC) fell within the definition of "handi-
cap" adopted by the Commission.32 However, this issue was clouded
by the lack of a legal definition of ARC.33 Thus, it was not clear
whether discrimination was illegal under Shuttleworth if based entirely
on (1) a person's symptomless infection with HIV ,4 (2) the mere per-
ception of such infection,35 or (3) fear of possible future infection. 6
Each of these three additional forms of discrimination is relatively
remote from the physical condition formally classified as AIDS.37 As
30. E.g., 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 449-58; Barford & Wiley, AIDS Discrimina-
tion in Florida: Further Restrictions on Employers' Rights, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 1988, at 45, 46.
31. This problem is discussed at length in the author's prior analysis of the statute. See 1988
AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 449-58.
32. Id. at 454.
33. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 297-303 (reproducing transcripts of Fla. S.,
Comm. on HRS, May 3, 1988) (comments of Gary Clarke and others)); 1988 AIDS Article,
supra note 2, at 498.
34. "HIV" means "human immunodeficiency virus," the causative agent of AIDS. It is
synonymous with the terms "lymphadenopathy-associated virus" (LAV) and human T-cell lym-
photrophic virus type three (HTLV-III), both earlier names given by researchers. Campbell,
Medical Aspects of AIDS-Related Litigation, in NATIONAL GAY RIGHTS ADVOCATES & NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD AIDS NETWORK, AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE
11-9 n.12 (2d ed. 1988).
The term "HIV" has been adopted by the Centers for Disease Control upon recommendation
of the Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health & Human Services. HIV Infection
Codes, 36 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT S-7, at
I-S (Supp. Dec. 25, 1987).
Whether HIV actually causes, or is the exclusive cause of, AIDS, has been the subject of some
controversy. See Campbell, supra, at 11-9 n.12. The National Academy of Sciences, however,
has concluded that HIV alone causes AIDS. UPDATE 1988, supra note 1, at 2. For a discussion
of the possible biological origins of HIV, see Essex & Kanki, The Origin of the AIDS Virus, Sc.
AM., Oct. 1988, at 64.
35. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 454-57.
36. Id. at 457-58.
37. To be formally described as "AIDS," the infections or cancers associated with HIV
infection must meet a rigorous five-step test prescribed by the Centers for Disease Control. Id.
474-75 n.159. First, the physician must discover no other diseases, drug use or congenital defect
that would cause immunosuppression. Second, the patient must be diagnosed with at least one of
twelve "indicator" diseases associated with AIDS. Third, if none of these diseases are present,
AIDS can be diagnosed if the patient tests positive for the AIDS virus and has a disease usually
caused by immunosuppression. Fourth, if normal diagnostic tests cannot be conducted, the phy-
sician can diagnose AIDS if the patient tests positive and has one of the seven most serious
AIDS-related illnesses. Fifth, in the absence of a positive test result, the physician can diagnose
AIDS only if the patient has (a) clinical evidence of pneumocystis carinii pneumonia or (b) any
one of the other twelve "indicator" diseases in combination with a T-lymphocyte blood cell
count of less than 400. Id. (quoting Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WEEKLY REPORT IS passim (Supp. Aug. 14, 1987)).
AIDS AND THE PERCEPTION OF AIDS
that remoteness increases, legal arguments that Shuttleworth applies
become less supportable. While one might contend that symptomless
HIV infection is a "handicap" because of its emotional and life-short-
ening effects,38 the logic becomes far more strained when discrimina-
tion is based on subjective notions about AIDS.3 9 The mere belief that
someone is or will become infected does not result in that person hav-
ing less than "the full and normal use of. . . sensory, mental or phys-
ical faculties," as Shuttleworth requires. 40
Such a narrow reading of Shuttleworth, however, would cause obvi-
ous social and policy problems. If employers violate the law by dis-
criminating only against persons with AIDS and ARC, then the
protections of the Human Rights Act apply only to a small fraction of
those whose lives currently are being affected by HIV. In April 1988,
for instance, the Florida Legislature estimated that over 200,000 Flori-
dians were infected with the virus .4  Of these, only 4,446 had full-
blown AIDS, and no more than about 42,000 had ARC. 42 The remain-
der were symptomless carriers who, though infected, remained healthy
and capable of being productive 3.4  Some knew of their infection;
many did not. Countless other persons could be perceived as being
"at risk" for HIV infection because of their life-styles, national ori-
gins or personal associations."
38. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 454-56.
39. See id. at 456-58.
40. This uncertainty was reflected in the legislative hearings on the Omnibus AIDS Act of
1988. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 207-08 (reproducing Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health
Care, transcript of hearing (Apr. 13, 1988) (comments of Rep. Lois Frankel, Dem., West Palm
Beach)).
41. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 445 n.4; R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 209
(reproducing Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of hearing at 19 (Apr. 13, 1988)
(comments of Rep. Frederick Lippman, Dem., Hollywood)); see Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Health Care, HB. 1519 (1988) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 28, 1988) (reported in R.C. WATERS, supra
note 1, app. B at 427.
42. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07 (1988) Staff Analysis 1
(May 3, 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla.
State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). The number of AIDS cases had risen to 7,700 by June 1,
1989. FLA. DEP'T OF HRS, ACQUIRED IMMUNODEFICIENCY SYNDROME (AIDS) SURVEILLANCE RE-
PORT 2 (June 1, 1989).
43. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 210-11 (reproducing Fla. H.R., Comm. on
Health Care, transcript of hearing (Apr. 13, 1988) (comments of Rep. Frankel)) (people with
symptomless HIV infection can remain productive for many years); id. at 426 (reproducing Fla.
H. R., transcript of floor debate (May 11, 1988) (comments of Rep. Frankel)) (society cannot
afford to provide welfare to those who lose jobs because of AIDS-related discrimination); id. at
435-38 (reproducing Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce, transcript of hearing (May 26, 1988) (testi-
mony of Rep. Frankel)) (infected persons can be productive for up to 10 years in some cases).
44. See, e.g., Schram, AIDS Prevention-Too Little, Too Late, 12 NOVA L. REv. 1253,
1255 (1988) (AIDS has been perceived as a "gay" disease).
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Denying the protection of Shuttleworth to symptomless carriers and
persons perceived as being "unknowing" or "future" carriers would
therefore endorse potential discrimination on a scale unprecedented
since the days of racial segregation.4 5 Such denial would permit dis-
crimination against persons who are healthy and able to contribute to
society, while granting broad protections to those who are actually ill.
Given the AIDS-related hysteria already evident in Florida,4 6 the result
might well be the loss of a significant portion of the state's productive
capacity, as well as bitter and unnecessary animosity.
B. The Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988
As the epidemic in Florida progressed and the number of the in-
fected persons grew larger, reforms became necessary. The most
sweeping of these reforms was the Omnibus AIDS Act of 1988. 47 This
broad series of enactments was meant to bring a radical attitudinal
change to the state in the face of the grim death toll expected in the
1990s. 48 One legislator predicted in 1988 that as many as 200,000 Flor-
idians will die of AIDS-related illnesses by the end of the century,
with an estimated cost to the state of up to a billion dollars per year. 49
45. Representative Frankel in 1988 repeatedly emphasized that the estimated number of in-
fected persons in Florida and the United States was very large and that society could not afford
the disruption that would be caused by discrimination against all persons believed to be infected.
R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 210-11 (1989) (reproducing Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health
Care, transcript of hearing (Apr. 13, 1988) (comments of Rep. Frankel)); id. at 426 (reproducing
Fla. H.R., transcript of floor debate (May 11, 1988) (comments of Rep. Frankel)); id. at 435-38
(reproducing Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce, transcript of hearing (May 26, 1988) (testimony of
Rep. Frankel)).
46. See infra notes 261-68 and accompanying text. For example, persons in the town of
Arcadia, Florida engaged in an active campaign of harassment directed at three hemophiliac
boys infected with HIV, leading up to the burning of the house in which the boys lived. Rays
Giving Up, Leaving Town, Sarasota Herald Tribune, Aug. 30, 1987, at IA, col. 5; see Ray v.
School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (lawsuit involving same children).
47. Ch. 88-380, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996 (codified at scattered sections throughout FLA. STAT.
(1989)). The Omnibus AIDS Act was the first of two reforms adopted after the Shuttleworth
order was issued, the second being the 1989 Enactment.
48. For instance, Rep. Lippman stated in 1988:
But I think also that we must recognize the incredible impact that this philosophic
change-or philosophic initiative is going to bring to the state ....
ITihe state says that we have 250,000 HIV. I'm going to tell you that we have closer
to 400,000 .... [I]f you want to be conservative . . . , 50 percent of those people will
be dead within the next six to eight years. Now, it's probably going to take those
deaths to recognize that this is no longer a gay, drug-abuse disease.
See, the public generally has not accepted that yet.
R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 209 (reproducing Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care,
transcript of hearing (Apr. 13, 1988) (comments of Rep. Lippman)).
49. Id. at 209-10 (quoting Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health Care, transcript of proceedings
(Apr. 13, 1988) (comments of Rep. Lippman)).
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In light of such forecasts, the 1988 Legislature concluded that AIDS-
related discrimination is contrary to the interests of society and must
be curbed. 0 The Legislature also determined that methods must be
established to encourage people to be tested voluntarily, without fear
of reprisal.5
Based on these two premises of the Omnibus AIDS Act, the 1988
Legislature enacted a series of AIDS-specific nondiscrimination and
confidentiality laws. These included provisions outlawing work-re-
lated discrimination based on the results of HIV-related tests;5 2 forbid-
ding employers from requiring HIV-related tests of their workers;53
providing strong civil remedies for AIDS-related discrimination in
housing,54 public accommodations and governmental services55 or dis-
crimination by any entity benefiting from state financial assistance;5 6
50. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 462-63 nn. 106-07 and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 463-64 nn.108-11 and accompanying text.
52. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)(b) (1989); see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 473-81. The
statute provides:
(b) No person may fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, segregate or
classify any individual in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive that individ-
ual of employment opportunities or adversely affect his status as an employee, or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of the results of a human immu-
nodeficiency virus-related test unless the absence of human immunodeficiency virus
infection is a bona fide occupational qualification of the job in question.
FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)(b) (1989).
53. Id. 760.50(3)(a); see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 472-73. The statute provides:
"(2)(a) No person may require an individual to take a human immunodeficiency virus-related
test as a condition of hiring, promotion, or continued employment unless the absence of human
immunodeficiency virus infection is a bona fide occupational qualification for the job in ques-
tion." FLA. STAT § 760.50(3)(a) (1989).
54. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.50(1), 760.50(4)(a) (1989); see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at
468-70, 83. Section 760.50(1) (Supp. 1988) provided in pertinent part: "1) Any person with ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome, acquired immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or
human immunodeficiency virus shall have every protection made available to handicapped per-
sons under the Fair Housing Act, ss. 760.20-760.37 .... FLA STAT. § 760.50(1) (Supp. 1988).
The phrase "under the Fair Housing Act, ss. 760.20-760.37" was deleted in the 1989 session
when all of the limiting language attached to this provision was deleted. This deletion is dis-
cussed more fully infra, notes 99-109 and accompanying text. Section 760.50(3)(a) provided in
pertinent part: "(3)(a) A person may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual
in housing . . . on the basis of the fact that such individual is, or is regarded as being, infected
with human immunodeficiency virus." FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(a) (Supp. 1988).
55. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(a) (1989); see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 481-85. The
statute provides in pertinent part: "(3)(a) A person may not discriminate against an otherwise
qualified individual in ... public accommodations, or governmental services on the basis of the
fact that such individual is, or is regarded as being, infected with human immunodeficiency
virus." FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(a) (1989).
56. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(b) (1989); see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 485-88. The
statute provides in pertinent part: "(3)(b) A person or other entity receiving or benefiting from
state financial assistance may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual on the
basis of the fact that such individual is, or is regarded as being, infected with human immunode-
ficiency virus." FLA. STAT. § 760.50 (4)(b) (1989).
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and giving significant new protections to health care professionals
who suffer discrimination because they are perceived as treating in-
fected patients .17
Despite the broad policies that inspired it, the Omnibus Act won
final approval with a number of vague provisions and oversights that
cast some doubt on how fully it would achieve its goals. 8 Many of the
errors were minor. For instance, the section protecting health care
professionals overlooked the possibility that many workers in health
institutions may not be legally protected because they do not qualify
as "professionals." 5 9 This oversight was corrected in the 1989 ses-
sionA0
Other vague portions of the law proved far more troublesome. No-
table by its absence, for example, was any provision addressing the
proper meaning of the term "handicap" as used in the Human Rights
Act and in Shuttleworth. An earlier version of the 1988 bill in the
House of Representatives had contained sections to codify Shuttle-
worth and to state that symptomless infection and the perception of
infection were "handicaps" under the Human Rights Act and other
laws. 61 These provisions were deleted, however, in the final compro-
57. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(d) (Supp. 1988); see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 488-89.
The statute provided in pertinent part:
(d) No person may fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, segregate or
classify any individual in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive that individ-
ual of employment opportunities or adversely affect his or her status as an employee,
or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of the fact that the individual is a
licensed health care professional who treats or provides patient care to persons in-
fected with human immunodeficiency virus.
FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(d) (Supp. 1988).
58. These problems are documented in 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 449-90.
59. See Pierce v. AALL Ins., Inc., 531 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 1988) (defining "professional" as
any person practicing a vocation that requires at least a four-year college degree); see also 1988
AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 489 (discussing the problem).
60. See ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(d)
(1989)). The error originally was noted in 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 489.
61. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. B at 198-202 (reproducing Fla. H.R., Comm. on
Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07, §§ 72-74 (draft of Apr. 13, 1988)). The pertinent sections of
the Omnibus AIDS Act's early drafts had stated: "Section 72 .... (4) PROHIBITION
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION. (a) A person may not discriminate against an otherwise quali-
fied individual in employment ... on the basis of the fact that such individual is, or is regarded
as being, infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus." Id. at 199 (reproducing Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07, § 72 (draft of Apr. 13, 1988)); "Section 73 ....
For the purposes of defining an unlawful employment practice under §§ 760.01-760.10 [the Hu-
man Rights Act] for an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-man-
agement committee, the term handicap shall include Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection." Id. at 201 (reproducing Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07, § 73
(draft of Apr. 13, 1988)); "Section 74 .... 760.22 Definitions.-As used in ss. 760.20-760.37
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mise bill. 62 Thus, it was unclear whether the Omnibus AIDS Act had
extended Shuttleworth to address the full range of HIV-related dis-
crimination.
Strong arguments existed that the two premises of the Omnibus
AIDS Act, combined with some of its substantive language, required
this extension. Such a conclusion might be derived particularly from
the provision prohibiting workplace discrimination based on HIV-re-
lated test results. 63 Because scientifically valid information on AIDS
can be obtained only through such tests, any AIDS-related job dis-
crimination arguably runs afoul of this section. 64
Nevertheless, the deletion of the earlier draft sections left the issue
unsettled. Despite the arduous work that went into the Omnibus
AIDS Act, the 1988 Legislature's final compromise AIDS bill failed to
clarify exactly how the Human Rights Act and other handicap laws
would relate to AIDS and the perception of AIDS in Florida.
II. HISTORY OF THE 1989 ENACTMENT
Commentators and practitioners examining the 1988 AIDS-related
nondiscrimination laws were faced with an ambiguity whose resolu-
tion ultimately led to the 1989 Enactment. On the one hand, detailed
analysis of the legislative history showed that, with a few noteworthy
exceptions, 65 the Omnibus AIDS Act was meant to outlaw most forms
of AIDS-related discrimination. 66 On the other hand, the exact lan-
guage of the Omnibus AIDS Act did not answer the most significant
question: whether symptomless infection and the mere perception of
infection were "handicaps" under Florida law. 67 The result was a
good deal of confusion in the year between the 1988 and 1989 Legisla-
tive Sessions.
[the Fair Housing Act], the term: (5) 'Handicap' means: .... (c) A person infected with, or
regarded as infected with, Human Immunodeficiency Virus." Id. at 201-02 (reproducing Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC 88-07, § 74 (draft of Apr. 13, 1988)).
62. Compare id. at 198-202 (reproducing Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health Care, PCB for HC
88-07, §§ 72-74 (draft of Apr. 13, 1988)) (declaring that AIDS-related discrimination constituted
handicap discrimination) with ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1996, 2029-31 (omitting these
provisions). See 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 458-62.
63. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(b) (1989).
64. This argument is made in 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 473-81.
65. The primary exception was the refusal of the Florida Senate to adopt language in the
Omnibus AIDS Act that would have extended the Shuttleworth decision to businesses with fewer
than 15 employees. See 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 456.
66. This legislative history is quoted and analyzed in detail. Id. 458-67. Transcripts of all
the major legislative hearings on the Omnibus AIDS Act are reproduced in R.C. WATERS, supra
note 1, app. A, along with copies of all early drafts and analyses of the bill. Id. app. B.
67. Id. at 449-58; Barford & Wiley, supra note 30, at 46.
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A. Precursors in the Omnibus AIDS Act
Some commentators were swayed by the 1988 legislative history and
suggested that all or most forms of employment discrimination were
rendered illegal. 68 A few even speculated that the Omnibus AIDS Act
made it unlawful to discriminate against intravenous drug abusers. 69
They based this argument on a single vague provision in the Omnibus
AIDS Act, subsection 760.50(1),70 that purported to give HIV-infected
persons "every protection made available to handicapped persons un-
der the ... [federal] Rehabilitation Act .... ,,7" Because a few lower
federal courts had found that the definition of "handicap" in the Re-
habilitation Act included AIDS and symptomless HIV infection, 7
these commentators felt that the 1988 Legislature had incorporated
the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicap" by reference. 73 The
result, they believed, was a sweeping prohibition on AIDS-related dis-
crimination by "all Florida employers [and not just federal contrac-
tors and grantees] ."7
This reading, however, ignored the fact that a person can be "hand-
icapped" under the Rehabilitation Act and still not be entitled to any
of that law's "protection." Indeed, determining if a "handicap" ex-
isted is only the first step in the federal analysis. Basic tort law con-
cepts illuminate the problem. A "protection" is the legal right to be
free from conduct committed by persons who are under a duty to re-
frain from such conduct. No one may claim a civil law's protection
unless the "breaching" party actually was under such a duty. 71
68. Barford & Wiley, supra note 30, at 46; McHugh, AIDS in the Workplace: Policy, Prac-
tice and Procedure, 18 STETSON L. REV. 35, 62 (1988).
69. Barford & Wiley, supra note 30, at 46.
70. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(l) (Supp. 1988). This subsection was the provision amended by the
1989 Enactment. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
71. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (Supp. 1988); see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 470-71.
The section provided in pertinent part: "(1) Any person with acquired immune deficiency syn-
drome, acquired immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human immunodeficiency vi-
rus shall have every protection made available to handicapped persons under .. . s. 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112." FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (Supp. 1988). This
provision was rewritten in 1989 to delete the reference to the federal Rehabilitation Act as well as
other limiting language. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
760.50(2) (1989)).
72. See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); Doe v.
Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2514 PAR (PX) (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988) (1988 WESTLAW
81776).
73. Barford & Wiley, supra note 30, at 46-47.
74. Barford & Wiley, supra note 23, at 46 (emphasis in original); accord McHugh, supra
note 68, at 62.
75. See, e.g., Tiedler v. Little, 502 So. 2d 923, 925 n.l (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Lake Parker
Mall, Inc. v. Carson, 327 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
AIDS AND THE PERCEPTION OF AIDS
The second step in the analysis is to determine whether a duty was
owed to the handicapped individual. The Rehabilitation Act was clear
on this point. The "protections" created under the federal statute did
not extend to all handicapped persons but merely to a subclass-those
suffering discrimination by certain named entities. 76 These entities are
the only ones under a duty not to discriminate. The federal law names
them: "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
or ... any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or
by the United States Postal Service." ' 7 Unless the discriminatory con-
duct was committed by one of these entities, no duty, no breach, and
no "protection" existed. 78 The effort to incorporate these federal
"protections" into Florida law thus appeared dubious at best.
The 1988 Enactment attempted to impose an additional state law
duty on the entities named in the federal Rehabilitation Act. The su-
premacy clause of the federal Constitution, 79 however, almost cer-
tainly voided this effort, because the state cannot modify federal
legislation, regulate federal agencies, or attach conditions to federal
grants.80 Even the sponsor of this provision, Senator William Myers,"1
had conceded in the 1988 legislative hearings that the language
"doesn't really say anything other than there is a federal law."8 2 This
interpretation was endorsed 3 by Representative Lois Frankel, 4 pri-
mary sponsor of the Omnibus AIDS Act in 19885.8 Frankel said the
provision was probably mere surplusage.8 6
76. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 793-94 (West Supp. 1989). The argument advanced by Barford &
Wiley, supra note 30, at 46, was all the more puzzling in light of their concession that "[t]he
only meaningful limitation to the protections of the Rehabilitation Act in Florida is that the Act
applies only to federal contractors and recipients of federal assistance." Id. (emphasis added).
They did not explain how "protections" could be limited in this way under federal law, but
somehow expanded to include all persons when a Florida statute purports to incorporate the
Rehabilitation Act by reference. See id. 46-47. In any event, the Rehabilitation Act also covers
postal workers, a fact they neglected to mention. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1989).
77. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West Supp. 1989).
78. Indeed, a "reference statute" has the effect of incorporating the literal language of the
statute as though it were recited verbatim. State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 1980).
79. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
80. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 470-71.
81. Repub., Hobe Sound.
82. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 452 (reproducing Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce,
transcript of hearing (May 26, 1988) (comments of Sen. Myers)). At this time, in fact, Sen.
Myers noted a staff analysis arguing that the mention of the Rehabilitation Act might have some
substantive effect. Id.
83. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 471 n.142 (citing Fla. S., Comm. on Commerce,
transcript of hearing at 20 (May 26, 1988) (comments of Sen. Myers)).
84. Dem., West Palm Beach.
85. Representative Frankel's role in the drafting of the Omnibus AIDS Act is documented
in 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2. Full transcripts of major legislative hearings also show she
was primarily responsible for the omnibus bill. See R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A.
86. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 471 n.142.
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The 1988 Legislature, then, did not settle the troubling question left
unresolved by Shuttleworth: whether symptomless HIV infection and
the perception of such infection were "handicaps" under Florida law.
More work was required, and it came in 1989.
B. Development of the 1989 Enactment
Partly as a result of the confusion caused by these provisions of the
Omnibus AIDS Act, Representative Frankel requested suggestions
from a number of sources, including the author of this Article. 87 On
March 1, 1989, the author submitted a package of proposed amend-
ments.8 The package included the following change to subsection
760.50(1), s9 the ambiguous provision discussed in the preceding sub-
section of this Article:
(2) Any person with or perceived as having Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome, Acquired Immune Related Complex, or
Human Immunodeficiency Virus shall have every protection
available to handicapped persons ,adir-7-60.2O- 37 ,F4e4da-atmues,
Pair- H neti t--si - - -E-Ne-. 93-.4+-t- Re~bkat-io
Aet-of-493.910
The 1989 Legislature adopted these amendments with a minor, tech-
nical alteration, 9' and Florida Governor Bob Martinez approved them
on July 5, 1989.92 The end result was the 1989 Enactment, and the
effect was threefold: (1) to delete the reference to the Rehabilitation
Act; (2) to delete the reference to the Fair Housing Act, thereby re-
87. See letter from Rep. Lois Frankel to Robert Craig Waters (Aug. 11, 1988) (available at
Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahas-
see, Fla.) (acknowledging Rep. Frankel's desire that the Author participate).
88. See Letter from Robert Craig Waters to Tom Cooper, Staff Analyst, Fla. H.R., Comm.
on Health Care, and Phil Williams, Staff Analyst, Fla. S., Comm. on Health Care (March 1,
1989) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State
Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) [hereinafter Waters Letter].
89. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (1989). It is important to note that, in the 1989 Florida Statutes,
the 1989 Enactment's changes to section 760.50(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), will result in
its being renumbered as section 760.50(2), Florida Statutes. See ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla Laws
2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)).
90. Waters Letter, supra note 88, app. D at 23 (additions underlined, deletions struck
through).
91. The word "made," which had been mistakenly omitted by the Author, was inserted
between the words "protection" and "available." Compare id. with ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla.
Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)). The word "made" was in the origi-
nal text of the 1988 statute and should have appeared in the proposal. See FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1)
(Supp. 1988).
92. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)).
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moving all other limiting language; and (3) to make the perception of
AIDS a protected handicap.
1. Deleting Reference to the Rehabilitation Act
As noted above, the reference to the Rehabilitation Act had
prompted some commentators to interpret the new law directly con-
trary to the legislative history, especially that of the 1988 Senate. 9
This history showed that subsection 760.50(1) had never been intended
to impose a duty upon persons not already bound by handicap dis-
crimination law, as these commentators had urged. 94 Rather, the 1988
Legislature had intended simply to equate AIDS, ARC and HIV infec-
tion with handicaps. 95 By deleting the reference to the Rehabilitation
Act, 96 the 1989 Legislature directly rejected the views of these com-
mentators. The duty to treat AIDS as a protected handicap would
bind only those people whom the handicap laws already have bound,
97
not the entire world.
93. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. In contrast, the author stated:
I do not believe it was what the Legislature intended, as evidenced by the Senate's
unwillingness in 1988 to extend Shuttleworth to small businesses (those with fewer
than 15 workers during specified periods of a year). Indeed, a section that would have
extended Shuttleworth to small businesses was the only nondiscrimination proposal
from the House that the Senate rejected.
Waters Letter, supra note 88, at 5; accord 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 458-62.
94. Barford and Wiley stated:
It applies not just to federal contractors and grantees or employers of 15 or more
employees, but to all employers regardless of type or size ....
The most likely interpretation of §45(1) [sic] is that by extending the protections of
the Rehabilitation Act to any person with AIDS, ARC or HIV, the legislature sought
to subject all Florida employers (and not just federal contractors and grantees) to the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act. This interpretation would rep-
resent a major expansion of AIDS discrimination law in Florida. Under this interpre-
tation, §45 [sic], unlike the Rehabilitation Act, would apply to employers of all types
rather than just federal contractors and grantees. And unlike the Florida Human
Rights Act, § 45 would apply to employers of all sizes rather than only those employ-
ing 15 or more employees. Put simply, all employees with AIDS, ARC, or HIV would
be protected by the new law.
Barford & Wiley, supra note 30, at 46; accord McHugh, supra note 68, at 62.
95. See 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 467-71; Waters Letter, supra note 88, at 5. This
argument applies, however, only to section 760.50(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988). Other pro-
visions of the Omnibus Act create special AIDS-specific civil rights, particularly in the areas of
HIV testing, discrimination by entities benefiting from state assistance and discrimination
against health care workers. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 471-89.
96. See ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2)
(1989)).
97. This does not mean, however, that additional remedies are not available to those with
or perceived as having AIDS, ARC, or HIV infection. Certainly, the Omnibus AIDS Act pro-
vides several extraordinary remedies other handicapped persons cannot seek. See FLA. STAT. §
760.50 (1989). Rather, the Legislature in enacting section 760.50(1) did not intend to create a
duty where none existed under the handicap discrimination laws mentioned in the statute, as
some of the commentators had urged. See Barford & Wiley, supra note 30, at 46.
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The deletion, however, was not intended as a rejection of the gen-
eral principles underlying the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, the deletion
acknowledged that the Florida Legislature is powerless to modify fed-
eral law or to regulate federal grants, federal executive agencies, or
the Postal Service. In this way, the 1989 Enactment clarified the ac-
tual intent of the Omnibus AIDS Act,98 which was to provide that
AIDS and the perception of AIDS are handicaps entitled to certain
specific protections under Florida law. The principles of the Rehabili-
tation Act were not rejected; they were used as the starting point for
the creation of a new state law that resolved the issues left unsettled
before.
2. Removing Other Limiting Language
In addition to deleting the reference to the Rehabilitation Act, the
1989 Enactment also removed a separate reference to the Fair Hous-
ing Act.99 These were the only two provisions of law specifically incor-
porated into subsection 760.50(1) in 1988 and they operated as
limiting language. Under settled rules of statutory construction, the
mention of only two specific statutes would mean that the Legislature
did not intend to incorporate any others.100 The 1989 Legislature's de-
letion of limiting language thus did not deny persons with AIDS or
the perception of HIV infection the protections of the Fair Housing
Act. Any other colhclusion is untenable in light of a separate statute
directly forbidding housing-related discrimination against these same
people. 0 '
The Legislature's purpose was only to remove all the limiting lan-
guage previously attached to subsection 760.50(1). This converts sub-
section 760.50(1) into a general "reference statute"-one that
incorporates the literal language of a number of other laws by refer-
ring to them by subject.10 2 The subject here is all other handicap dis-
crimination law, which is incorporated by reference to the
"protection" this law provides.
98. See ch. 89-350, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989))
(bill title stating that the 1989 Enactment provides legislative findings and clarifies existing non-
discriminatory provisions).
99. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (1989).
100. See, e.g., Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976). The principle is often expressed in
the Latin phrase "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," which means that the mention of one
thing excludes others. See id. at 817.
101. See FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(a) (1989). The protections of this separate statute are coex-
tensive with and supplement the Fair Housing Act. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 482-83.
102. See State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 1980); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla.
792, 808-09, 78 So. 693, 698 (1918); Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 276 (1859), overruled on other
grounds, Bushnell v. Dennison, 13 Fla. 77 (1869).
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Florida courts have long recognized the viability of this sort of gen-
eral reference statute. As early as 1859, for instance, the Florida Su-
preme Court held that a statutory reference to "the law regulating
descents" had the effect of incorporating all law on the subject. 03 As
late as 1980, the Court reaffirmed this principle. In State v. J.R.M.,' °4
the court upheld a reference statute against a charge it violated the
constitutional ban on amending other statutes by reference to their
titles alone. This ban applies, the court said, in only two instances: (1)
if the reference statute directly and irreconcilably conflicts with the
other statutes it purported to incorporate, or (2) if the reference stat-
ute seeks to revise the subject matter of the other statutes. 10 5
The 1989 Enactment does not run afoul of these concerns. First, no
"irreconcilable repugnancy"' 1 6 exists between the 1989 Enactment and
other handicap legislation. The former merely provides a partial defi-
nition of the term "handicap," so that AIDS and the perception of
AIDS-related infections will be included. Thus, "the former rule can
operate without conflicting with the latter."'' 0 7 Second, the 1989 En-
actment does not attempt to address the subject matter of the handi-
cap discrimination laws. The scope of these laws remains unchanged.
The 1989 Enactment merely resolves the question of whether the term
"handicap" includes AIDS-related problems and perceptions.
The effect is to declare that AIDS and the perception of AIDS-re-
lated infections are entitled to the protections provided by every Flor-
ida handicap discrimination statute and law, including the Fair
Housing Act. The reference to "every protection made available to
handicapped persons" 0 8 brooks no exceptions. Thus, by removing the
references to the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Act, the
1989 Legislature expanded subsection 760.50(1) so that it is now a ref-
erence statute, approved without violation of the Florida Constitu-
tion. 109
3. The Perception of AIDS as a "Handicap"
Finally, by adding a new clause to the statute,1' 0 the 1989 Enact-
ment expanded the definition of "handicap" to include the perception
103. Jones, 8 Fla. at 285.
104. 388 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 1980).
105. Id. at 1229.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)).
109. See J.R.M., 388 So. 2d at 1229.
110. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989))
(reprinted supra page 444).
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that a person has AIDS, ARC, or HIV infection. The new language
within this definition effectively settles one of the most difficult ques-
tions left unresolved by Shuttleworth and the Omnibus AIDS Act-
the status of those merely thought to be at risk of contracting
AIDS.' Read together, the Human Rights Act ' 12 and the declaration
contained in the 1989 Enactment now mean that workplace discrimi-
nation based on a mere perception of infection is as unlawful as dis-
crimination based on the disease itself. Thus, even an erroneous belief
that someone is infected by HIV is a handicap for purposes of Florida
handicap discrimination statutes.
In this way, the 1989 Enactment also addresses discrimination based
on the belief that someone will develop AIDS or related infections in
the future."l 3 The symptomless latency period of early HIV infection,
lasting a probable average of four and a half years," 4 necessarily fa-
vors this conclusion. Because of this long latency, a belief that some-
one will develop HIV-related infections at a later date is the equivalent
of saying that the person probably is infected today." 5 If AIDS is
thought to be in prospect, HIV infection must have occurred already.
Moreover, any attempt to excuse AIDS-related discrimination on the
basis of latency would permit the use of pretexts, such as saying one
did not perceive a present illness, but feared a future one.16 Logic
dictates that, if only for practical reasons, such pretexts cannot be tol-
erated under the 1989 Enactment.
This argument is strongly buttressed by another 1989 addition to
section 760.50-an explicit statement of findings and intent." 7 The
1989 Legislature declared that "persons infected or believed to be in-
fected with human immunodeficiency virus have suffered and will
continue to suffer irrational and scientifically unfounded discrimina-
tion.""' The Legislature then concluded that this discrimination
harms society itself. Such harm occurs because "otherwise able-bod-
ied persons are deprived of the means of supporting themselves, pro-
viding for their own health care, housing themselves, and
Ill. This question was discussed in 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 456-58.
112. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-10 (1989).
113. This problem was discussed in 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 457-58.
114. Mueller, The Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 14 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 250, 254 (1986).
115. See 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 458.
116. This argument is made in 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 457-58.
117. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (1989)).
This language also originated in the proposal submitted by the author of this Article at Repre-
sentative Frankel's request. See Waters Letter, supra note 88, at 22-23.
118. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (1989))
(emphasis added).
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participating in the opportunities otherwise available to them in soci-
ety." 119 Additionally, the 1989 Legislature explicitly labeled section
760.50 as remedial legislation intended "to correct these problems' ' 120
and thereby contribute to the welfare of society as a whole.
These findings, combined with the other provisions of the statute,
will ensure far-reaching protection against AIDS-related discrimina-
tion. Florida law requires that remedial statutes of this type be con-
strued broadly to achieve their purposes. 2' In the event of an
ambiguity in the statutory language, the courts are obligated to accept
the interpretation that best affords the remedies created by the Legis-
lature,122 even if the interpretation exceeds the literal language of the
statute. 123 Florida law also requires that statutes for the public welfare
must be liberally construed in favor of the public, even though such
statutes penalize specific persons who violate the law. 24
Thus, the statement of findings and intent added to section 760.50
in 1989 will require the courts to interpret the amended section 760.50
so as to achieve the legislature's purpose of eliminating harm to soci-
ety. This purpose, in turn, requires that people not be denied the op-
portunity to work, to take advantage of society's opportunities, to
support themselves, to obtain housing and to provide for their own
health care based on AIDS or the perception of HIV infection.
III. THE 1989 ENACTMENT'S INCORPORATION OF PRIOR HANDICAP
LAW
Because the 1989 Enactment is a general reference statute, the in-
corporation of other handicap laws125 will have a far-reaching impact.
Before the threat of AIDS was fully appreciated, Florida had adopted
a variety of statutes outlawing discrimination against the handicapped
in several contexts, particularly employment and housing. These prior
handicap statutes have been supplemented through the years with laws
that have further extended handicap discrimination law into other
contexts. Perhaps the most significant provision is a clause in the
119. Id.
120. Id. The specific language was that "remedies are needed to correct these problems." Id.
121. See, e.g., Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977); State ex rel. Cooper v. Coleman,
138 Fla. 520, 189 So. 691 (1939).
122. Neville v. Leamington Hotel Corp., 47 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1950); Becker v. Amos, 105 Fla.
231, 141 So. 136 (1932).
123. Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 276 (1859), overruled on other grounds, Bushnell v. Dennison,
13 Fla. 77 (1869).
124. State v. Hamilton, 388 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1971).
125. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Florida Constitution that explicitly guarantees equal protection and
other basic rights to the handicapped. 2 6
A. The Florida Constitution's "Handicap Clause"
The "handicap clause" was added to the state constitution by Flor-
ida voters on November 5, 1974.127 Falling under a constitutional sec-
tion labeled "[b]asic rights," the provision states in pertinent part that
"[nlo person shall be deprived of any right because of ... physical
handicap.' ' 2 8 The provision further states that these rights include
equality before the law, the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty,
the right to pursue happiness, the right to be rewarded for industry,
and the right to acquire, possess and protect property. 29 Based on this
constitutional language, the physically handicapped in Florida should
be entitled to equal protection-the right to be treated the same as
anyone else under the law.
1. Effects of the Constitutional Provision
By incorporating prior handicap law, the 1989 Enactment extends
state constitutional protections to those who have AIDS, ARC, HIV
infection or the perception of any of these illnesses. The 1989 Enact-
ment thus resolves a question not yet addressed by the courts: whether
the term "physical handicap" in the Florida Constitution includes
AIDS-related conditions or perceptions. Previously, some authors be-
lieved that it did, 30 and the issue had been raised but not resolved in
at least one lawsuit based on AIDS discrimination. 3'
The 1989 Enactment shows that, as a matter of public policy, the
law of Florida recognizes AIDS-related conditions and perceptions as
handicaps. This is only in keeping with the interpretation of other sta-
tutes. As discussed earlier in this Article, the use of the term "handi-
cap" in the Florida Human Rights Act has been construed to include
AIDS. 3 2 Similarly, the Florida Department of Education has inter-
preted the term "handicap" in education-related statutes to include
AIDS and related conditions. 33 Additionally, no Florida court or ad-
126. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
127. 25A FLA. STAT. 2 (West Supp. 1990) (annotation to art. I, § 2).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See R. C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 4.01; McHugh, supra note 68, at 56-57.
131. See Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp. 654, 660 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
132. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
133. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 12.12 (1989) (citing Fla. Dep't of Education, Memoran-
dum: Guidelines for District AIDS Policies and Procedures (Oct. 14, 1987) [hereinafter Fla.
Dep't of Ed. Memorandum]).
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ministrative body addressing the question has excluded AIDS-related
conditions and perceptions from the definition of the term "handi-
cap."
Accordingly, the author submits that the issue now has been settled
by the Legislature. The 1989 Enactment, read in light of the unifor-
mity of law and public policy on this matter, should mean that AIDS,
ARC, HIV infection, and the perception of any of these illnesses now
are "physical handicaps" under state constitutional law. Thus, those
afflicted or perceived as being afflicted would be protected by the
"handicap clause" contained in the state constitution's equal protec-
tion provision. The next question is the exact scope of these protec-
tions.
2. Scope of the Constitutional Protection
The extent of the state equal protection guarantee was previously
settled in Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines,3 4 where the Florida Su-
preme Court determined that discrimination is not forbidden by the
state constitution unless it originates in "state action."'3 The First
District Court of Appeal suggested two theories as to the meaning of
"state action," both of which are concerned primarily with determin-
ing whether the state is sufficiently involved in the activity in ques-
tion. 36 Thus, the equal protection provision binds only the state and
its agents, not private parties.
Another limitation arises from the two alternative standards of re-
view used by Florida's courts to gauge the propriety of a government-
sponsored discriminatory act: the so-called "rational basis" test and
the "strict scrutiny" test. 37 Generally, the more severe strict scrutiny
134. 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983), approving and adopting 408 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA
1982).
135. Id. at 569-70.
136. Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines & Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 408 So. 2d 711, 717 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982) (citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)). The two
tests, derived from analogous federal case law, are called the "symbiotic relationship" test and
the "close nexus" test.
The symbiotic relationship test asks whether "a symbiotic relationship [exists] between the
state and private concerns which in effect made them joint partners in discrimination." Id. The
close nexus test asks "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the chal-
lenged action of the private party so that the action of the later [sic] may be fairly treated as that
of the state itself." Id. (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
It is unclear which of these tests is preferred in Florida. The United States Supreme Court has
continued to analyze the state action issue using both tests, without apparently favoring one or
the other. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee,
483 U.S. 522, 547 n.29 (1987).
137. It is now clear that a "strict scrutiny" analysis is applied purely as a matter of Florida
constitutional law. See De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 207
(Fla. 1989); Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 1987).
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test requires that the statute or regulation in question be based on a
compelling state need advanced by the least restrictive means availa-
ble. This test is applied only when fundamental rights are involved or
the discrimination is aimed at a "suspect class," such as a racial or
religious group. 3 ' Otherwise, the courts use the rational basis test,
which gives great deference to the governmental activity, even if it dis-
criminates between two similarly situated groups.'3 9 Thus, the ques-
tion arises whether the handicapped are a suspect class.
The language of the Florida Constitution strongly suggests that the
physically handicapped are a suspect class, explicitly placing them on
a level with other suspect classes. 14' Specifically, the only minorities
actually named in the Florida equal protection provision are racial
groups, religious groups, and the handicapped. 141 It follows that a dis-
criminatory act based on physical handicap should be regarded as "in-
herently suspect" and deserving of substantial judicial scrutiny under
state law, even though the physically handicapped are not given this
higher degree of judicial review under the federal Constitution. 142 The
Florida courts now may be obligated to apply at least something ap-
proaching a "strict scrutiny" test, rather than the more lenient "ra-
tional basis" test, in state handicap discrimination cases.'' Hence, in
light of the 1989 Enactment, both AIDS-related illnesses and the per-
ception of them now fall within these same constitutional protections.
In sum, the Legislature determined in 1989 that "[a]ny person with
or perceived as having [AIDS, ARC or HIV infection] shall have
every protection made available to handicapped persons." 44 Foremost
among these protections is the Florida Constitution's guarantee that
the physically handicapped are entitled to equal protection, the same
as racial and religious minorities. The author thus submits that the
1989 Enactment equated the constitutional term "physical handicap"
with AIDS, ARC, HIV infection, and the perception of any of these
illnesses-a conclusion underscored by the liberal construction ac-
138. See De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 206-07; Palm Harbor, 516 So. 2d at 251.
139. Palm Harbor, 516 So. 2d at 251.
140. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
141. Id.
142. See Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 337 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Gurmankin v. Costanzo,
411 F. Supp. 982, 992 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
143. Florida courts, purely as a matter of state constitutional law, follow the "strict scru-
tiny" approach whenever the government engages in an act that treats a suspect class differently
from others. De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 207, 207 (Fla.
1989); Palm Harbor, 516 So. 2d at 251-52.
144. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)).
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corded to terms in the constitution. 41 People who have these condi-
tions or suffer from these perceptions now are entitled to a stricter
level of scrutiny when they suffer government-sponsored discrimina-
tion. This strict scrutiny applies either as a matter of statutory law
under the 1989 Enactment or as a matter of a definite state policy that
people with AIDS, or the perception of AIDS-related conditions, are
to be regarded as handicapped under all Florida law.
B. The Florida Human Rights Act of 1977
One of the most far-reaching state handicap discrimination laws,
after the Florida Constitution's "handicap clause," is the Human
Rights Act of 1977.'4 As noted earlier, this statute was the basis of
the landmark Shuttleworth order.147 Before the Omnibus AIDS Act
was passed, the Human Rights Act was the primary state-law vehicle
for redressing AIDS-related job discrimination. Read in light of the
1989 Enactment, the Human Rights Act now will be applied to pro-
hibit job-related discrimination whenever it arises from the fact or
perception that someone has an AIDS-related illness or infection. In
effect, the 1989 Enactment both codifies Shuttleworth and extends its
principles to those with symptomless HIV infection and those per-
ceived as being infected.
1. Scope of the Protections
The protections afforded by the Human Rights Act will be substan-
tial. In a series of subsections, the Human Rights Act prohibits dis-
crimination against the handicapped in hiring, firing, and job-related
conditions, privileges, or compensation;141 in internal job policies and
classifications; 49 in the practices of employment agencies; 50 in the
practices of labor organizations; 5' in apprenticeship and job-training
145. Words contained in the constitution should be accorded a broader and more liberal
construction than would those in a statute. Florida Soc'y of Ophthalmology v. Florida Optomet-
ric Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 1118, 1119 (Fla. 1986) (citing State Highway Comm'n v. Spainhower, 504
S.W.2d 121, 125 (Mo. 1973)).
146. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.10 (1989).
147. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
148. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(l)(a) (1989).
149. Id. § 760.10(l)(b).
150. Id. § 760.10(2).
151. Id. § 760.10(3). A "labor organization" is defined as "any organization which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers con-
cerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment, or other mutual aid or protection in
connection with employment." Id. § 760.02(8).
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programs; 5 2 in job-related licensing or certification programs; 53 in
job-related advertisements; 5 4 and in case of retaliation for a com-
plaint filed under the Human Rights Act.' Read in light of the 1989
Enactment, the effect of these subsections will be to prohibit virtually
all job-related discrimination against those who have, or are believed
to have, AIDS or related infections.
2. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense
The Human Rights Act is subject to one defense, however, that
may sometimes, if rarely, be applicable in this context. Closely track-
ing analogous federal law, 156 the Human Rights Act permits excep-
tions for "bona fide occupational qualifications" (BFOQs).' 5" BFOQs
generally exist when the discriminatory act is based on a job qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the essence of the business and when, in
addition, those who lack the qualification either will be unable to
work safely and efficiently or cannot be reasonably identified by the
employer. 58 In a few cases, a BFOQ might apply to AIDS-related job
discrimination. For instance, an employer might reasonably refuse to
hire someone suffering from a physically debilitating symptom of
HIV infection, such as AIDS-related dementia, 5 9when it impairs job
performance.
The BFOQ exception, however, does not offer any guidance on
more subtle "facially neutral" forms of discrimination. Employers
might adopt policies, for example, that inordinately affect people with
AIDS but do not expressly discriminate against them, such as policies
against excessive absenteeism. In analogous situations, the federal
courts have examined the employer's actions to determine whether
they were mere "pretexts."' 60 If, for instance, a policy against exces-
sive absenteeism is applied selectively to people with AIDS but not to
others, the courts might find it to be an impermissible pretext.
152. Id. § 760.10(4).
153. Id. § 760.10(5).
154. Id. § 760.10(6).
155. Id. § 760.10(7).
156. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1987) (Title ViI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
157. FLA. STAT. § 760.10(8)(a) (1989).
158. Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927, 937 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (quoting Usery
v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 235 (5th Cir. 1976)).
159. AIDS-related "HIV dementia" is a disabling of thinking and motor functions interfer-
ing with daily activities when nothing other than a positive HIV test can explain the impairment.
R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 1.06, at 23 & n. 137 (citing Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case
Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 36 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MOR-
BIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT IS, 14S (Supp. Aug. 14, 1987)).
160. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); see
also R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 2.02(c).
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Even in the absence of a provable pretext, the federal courts still
have applied close scrutiny to some job policies that have a "disparate
impact" on protected classes.16' An example might be a policy against
absenteeism that apparently was applied evenhandedly, but that had
the effect of forcing all employees with AIDS to lose their jobs. In
such instances, the courts have required an employer to justify its pol-
icy as a "business necessity,"' 162 which means the policy in question
must be reasonably necessary for the safe and efficient operation of
the business. If the employer can justify a practice according to "busi-
ness necessity," the employee can prevail only by showing that rea-
sonable alternative policies could have accomplished the business
purposes without having a disparate impact.163
The Human Relations Commission has not yet indicated whether it
will apply the federal "pretext" and "business necessity" concepts to
state handicap discrimination. Nevertheless, at least one Florida ap-
pellate court has suggested that these theories may be useful. 164 If the
Human Relations Commission and the courts accept this view, the
Human Rights Act could sweep very broadly in the area of AIDS-
related job discrimination. It could mean that employers are signifi-
cantly restricted even in adopting facially neutral policies if the burden
falls too heavily on those with, or those perceived as having, AIDS.
By declaring that AIDS and the perception of HIV infection are hand-
icaps, the 1989 Enactment may have broadened the Human Rights
Act so that it now reaches both "pretexts" and "unnecessary" busi-
ness policies, subject to the BFOQ defense.
C. The Florida Fair Housing Act of 1983
Another broad handicap discrimination statute is the Florida Fair
Housing Act. 165 Passed by the Legislature in 1983166 and amended sub-
stantially in 1984,167 the Fair Housing Act now makes it illegal to dis-
criminate against handicapped persons"14 in practices associated with
161. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (lth Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1188 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971)); see also R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 2.02(c).
162. See, e.g., Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552.
163. E.g., id. at 1553.
164. See School Bd. of Pinellas Cty. v. Rateau, 449 So. 2d 839, 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
165. FLA. STAT. §§ 760.20-.37 (1989).
166. Ch. 83-221, 1983 Fla. Laws 1127.
167. Ch. 84-117, 1984 Fla. Laws 388.
168. As noted earlier, the Fair Housing Act expressly defines "handicapped person." See
supra note 9. This definition, however, is entirely consistent with the conclusion reached in this
Article, that having AIDS and being perceived as having a HIV infection are handicaps.
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buying, selling, and renting housing. This statute, read in light of the
1989 Enactment, now will be extended to cover people with AIDS,
ARC, HIV infection, or the perception of any of these illnesses.1 69
1. Scope of the Statute
These protections are very broad. The Fair Housing Act prohibits
discrimination against the handicapped in rentals and sales in gen-
eral; 170 in the terms, conditions, or privileges of a sale or rental;1 7' in
real estate advertisements;' 72 in making representations that property
is unavailable for inspection, rental, or sale;" 3 in "preemptively" sell-
ing or renting to a non-handicapped person to exclude one who is
handicapped; 174 in access to multiple listing services and real estate
brokers; 175 in real estate financing; 76 and when the discrimination is in
retaliation for filing a complaint under the Fair Housing Act.177 Under
the state policy contained in the 1989 Enactment, these same protec-
tions now will be extended to persons with, or perceived as having,
any AIDS-related illness or condition.
2. Exceptions
The Fair Housing Act, like the Human Rights Act, is subject to
some exceptions. Most significant is an exemption provided to land-
lords or sellers who do not own more than three "dwellings ' ' 78 at a
time. 179 This exemption, however, cannot be claimed more than once
in a two-year period, 180 or if the landlord or seller has any interest in
rents or proceeds from more than three other single-family houses at
any one time. 181 Nor can the exemption be claimed if a realtor or other
169. Other statutes extend similar protections to those who are handicapped by AIDS or
AIDS-related perceptions in the area of housing. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(a) (1989).
170. Id. § 760.23(1).
171. Id. § 760.23(2).
172. Id. § 760.23(3).
173. Id. § 760.23(4).
174. Id. § 760.23(5).
175. Id. § 760.24.
176. Id. § 769.25.
177. Id. § 760.37.
178. The term "dwelling" is defined as:
any building or structure, or portion thereof, which is occupied as, or designated or
intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land
which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location on the land of any
such building or structure, or portion thereof.
Id. § 760.22(4). The term "family" includes a single individual. Id. § 760.22(6).
179. Id. § 760.29(l)(a)l.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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person engaged in the business of selling or renting dwellings is in-
volved in the transaction. 11 2 An owner waives the exemption by pub-
lishing any advertisement indicating an intent to violate the Fair
Housing Act. 183 Other exemptions apply to boarding houses and simi-
lar structures housing both the owner and no more than four other
families or persons; 184 to housing operated by certain religious organi-
zations for the benefit of their own members; 185 and to private clubs
that operate housing for their own members. 186
D. Receipt and Use of State-Backed Housing Loans
The 1989 Enactment's incorporation of prior handicap law will im-
pact housing discrimination in another way. Under a separate Florida
Statute, entities that have received state-backed housing loans under
the Affordable Housing Loan Program cannot discriminate against
the handicapped. 187 Similar restrictions applied to recipients of loans
under the now defunct Community-Based Organization Loan Pro-
gram. 188 These protections extend not only to leasing, use, or occu-
pancy of housing units built with the loan; they also cover the
employment practices associated with the operation and maintenance
of the housing project. 8 9 Under the policy announced in the 1989 En-
actment, these same protections now will extend to those with, or per-
ceived as having, AIDS or HIV infection.
E. The Educational Equity Act of 1984
Another significant statute is the Florida Educational Equity Act,
passed in 1984.190 This statute was aimed at banning discrimination
against the handicapped in virtually every state-supported educational
setting in Florida, including public schools, colleges, and universi-
ties. 191 Read together with the 1989 Enactment, the Educational
Equity Act now will extend these protections to those who have AIDS
or are perceived as having any HIV-related infection.192
182. Id. § 760.29(l)(a)Ia.
183. Id. § 760.29(l)(a)lb.
184. Id. § 760.29(1)(a)2.
185. Id. § 760.29(2).
186. Id.
187. Id. § 420.605(5)(i)1 (1989).
188. Id. § 420.607(2)(g)1 (1987), repealed by ch. 88-376, 1988 Fla. Laws 1936, 1977.
189. Id. § 420.605(5)(i)1 (1989).
190. Id. § 228.2001; see ch. 84-305, 1984 Fla. Laws 1435, 1439.
191. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 12.05.
192. Even before the 1989 Enactment, the Florida Department of Education had concluded
that symptomless HIV infection and being perceived as having such infection were handicaps
under the Educational Equity Act. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 12.05.
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These protections are some of the broadest afforded the handi-
capped by state law. The Educational Equity Act explicitly forbids
discrimination in all educational programs and activities and in the
hiring practices of state-supported educational entities. 93 It applies to
any public educational institution that receives or benefits from fed-
eral or state financial assistance. 94 The statute's prohibitions cover
not only direct discrimination, but also activities that merely "have
the effect of restricting access by persons of a particular .. .handi-
cap." 95 Finally, the statute specifically prohibits discrimination
against the handicapped in the right to attend classes' 96 and in guid-
ance, financial aid, and other counseling services. 97
By incorporating the Educational Equity Act, the 1989 Enactment
essentially codifies existing state rules and policy. In an October 14,
1987 memorandum, State Education Commissioner Betty Castor ad-
vised the Florida educational system that AIDS, symptomless HIV in-
fection, and the perception of such infection are handicaps under the
Educational Equity Act. 98 Accordingly, the 1989 Enactment endorses
and codifies the statements of Commissioner Castor.
F. The Emergency Medical Services Act of 1988
At the same time as the Omnibus AIDS Act was passed in 1988, the
Legislature also adopted a separate statute covering the rights of
handicapped persons'seeking emergency medical services at a hospi-
tal.199 In pertinent part, the statute declares that a hospital's decision
to provide emergency medical services cannot "be based upon, or af-
fected by, the person's . . .physical or mental handicap .... ,,20o If
the patient has acute symptoms or pain that could result in serious
harm or dysfunction, 20 1 the patient is entitled to receive care sufficient
to relieve or eliminate the condition, 20 2 "within the service capacity of
193. FLA. STAT. § 228.2001(2)(a) (1989).
194. Id.
195. Id. § 228.2001(2)(b).
196. Id. § 228.2001(2)(c).
197. Id. § 228.2001(2)(e).
198. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, § 12.12 (reproducing Dept. of Ed. Memorandum, supra
note 133). The memorandum in turn relied on a State Board of Education administrative rule
defining "handicap" broadly as any physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities, a history of such impairment, or being perceived as having such
impairment. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 6A-19.001(6) (1988). This rule draws heavily from the federal
Rehabilitation Act's definition of "handicap." See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. 1989).
199. FLA. STAT. § 395.0142 (1989).
200. Id. § 395.0142(3)(b).
201. Id. § 395.0142(2)(c).
202. Id. § 395.0142(3)(a).
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the facility. ' 203 Read in light of the 1989 Enactment, the Emergency
Medical Services Act now will have the effect of prohibiting hospitals
from refusing otherwise available acute medical care based on the fact
or perception that a person is HIV-infected or has AIDS.
204
It is significant to note that the Emergency Medical Services Act
supplements other related laws. As part of the 1988 Omnibus AIDS
Act, the Legislature had enacted nondiscrimination laws forbidding
all AIDS-related discrimination against "otherwise qualified
persons ' 20 5 in the provision of governmental services 2° 6 or by any en-
tity receiving state financial assistance. 20 7 Government-operated hospi-
tals fall under both of these laws, and a significant number of private
hospitals fall under the second. Such hospitals could not selectively
turn away people with AIDS, including those who need acute medical
care, because doing so would constitute discrimination against an oth-
erwise qualified person. 20 8 Thus, in the context of AIDS-related hospi-
tal care, the Emergency Medical Services Act, together with the 1989
Enactment, adds to these earlier laws by prohibiting all other private
hospitals from turning away people with AIDS who need acute care.
G. Insurance
Several provisions of state law significantly restrict the way insurers
can limit insurance coverage of the handicapped. For instance, a state
law governing non-group insurance states that insurers may not "re-
fuse to provide, or ... charge unfairly discriminatory rates for,
health insurance coverage for a person solely because the person is
mentally or physically handicapped. ' ' 209 A similar prohibition has
203. Id. § 395.0142(2)(d).
204. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that the Emergency Medical Services Act also
prohibits discrimination based on a "preexisting medical condition." Id. § 395.0142(3)(b).
205. The term "otherwise qualified" means: "that no reasonable accommodation can be
made to prevent the likelihood that the individual will, under the circumstances involved, expose
other individuals to a significant possibility of being infected with human immunodeficiency
virus." Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 FLA. LAWS 2233, 2251 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(c)
(1989)). The term "otherwise qualified," borrowed from the federal Rehabilitation Act, fre-
quently is used in connection with employment-related discrimination. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794
(Supp. 1988). However, the relevant portions of the Omnibus AIDS Act do not limit the applica-
tion merely to employment settings; they cover all settings. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws
2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 760.50(4)(a)-(b) (1989)).
206. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(a)
(1989)).
207. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(b) (1989)).
208. This assumes the hospital in fact has adequate facilities and staff to treat the particular
acute illness in question. The hospital would not be obligated to give any service it lacks the
capacity to provide. FLA. STAT. § 395.0142(2)(d) (1989).
209. Id. § 627.644 (1989). The insurer, however, is not required to cover the expenses arising
from a handicap that predates insurance coverage. Id.
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been placed on group, blanket, and franchise health insurance poli-
cies. 210 Another statute provides that group policies cannot terminate
the insurance of handicapped dependents because they have reached a
certain age, provided the parent or guardian continues to be covered
under the group policy. 211
Under the 1989 Enactment, these insurance laws now must be read
as applying equally to people with, or perceived as having, AIDS or
HIV infection. The effect is to supplement similar insurance laws
passed as part of the Omnibus AIDS Act, which prohibited many
forms of AIDS-related discrimination in the insurance industry.212
While the 1988 laws dealt with a number of other forms of discrimina-
tion, they did not directly address issues such as discriminatory rates
and termination of coverage for handicapped dependents. Thus, the
1989 Enactment's incorporation of prior handicap discrimination law
will extend significantly the protections afforded to those suffering
AIDS-related insurance discrimination.
H. Serving Alcoholic Beverages
Another of the state's handicap discrimination statutes covers li-
censed retail alcoholic beverage establishments. Under this statute,
such establishments are recognized as private businesses with the au-
thority to refuse to serve an "objectionable or undesirable" person. 213
This right, however, cannot be exercised based on "physical handi-
cap," among other reasons.21 4 Under the 1989 Enactment, the term
"physical handicap" will encompass persons with, or perceived as
having, AIDS or HIV infection. This protection duplicates and reiter-
ates a portion of the Omnibus AIDS Act that directly outlawed dis-
crimination against such persons in "public accommodations,"2 '5
including restaurants and alcoholic beverage establishments. 21 6
L Government Jobs
One of the other major protections afforded the handicapped by
state law concerns government jobs. For instance, one statute declares
that the policy of the state is that all government job-related decisions
210. Id. § 627.644. Again, an insurer is not required to pay expenses arising from a handicap
that predates insurance coverage. Id.
211. Id. § 627.6615.
212. See R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, §§ 7.01-.09.
213. FLA. STAT. § 562.51 (1989).
214. Id.
215. Seeid. § 760.50(3)(a) (Supp. 1988).
216. See 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 483.
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"shall be made without regard to . . . handicap," unless a BFOQ ap-
plies. 217 This policy has been implemented by two other laws. One
makes it unlawful in the state career service to base employment deci-
sions on a person's handicap. 218 The second makes it unlawful for lo-
cal government bodies to discriminate in their own employment
practices based on handicap, 219 and grants a limited right for ag-
grieved persons to challenge such actions in the circuit court.220 Under
the 1989 Enactment, these provisions also will prohibit discrimination
based on AIDS or the perception of HIV infection.
These handicap statutes duplicate other legal provisions. Several
subsections of the Omnibus AIDS Act directly forbid these types of
discriminatory job practices based on AIDS or the perception of
AIDS. One, for instance, outlaws discrimination by any entity bene-
fitting from state financial assistance,22" ' which includes every agency
of state government. Another provision of the Omnibus AIDS Act
makes it unlawful to discriminate based on the results of an HIV-re-
lated test. 222 Because no information on a person's HIV status can be
obtained except through such tests, 223 virtually any job-related dis-
crimination based on AIDS-related concerns is arguably illegal, in-
cluding discrimination by governmental agencies.
IV. REMEDIES
As shown in the foregoing discussion, the 1989 Enactment equates
AIDS and the perception of AIDS with handicaps. It thus cloaks
AIDS-related discrimination with all the "protections" contained in
other state handicap discrimination law. The 1989 Enactment operates
as a binding statement of legislative policy. In effect, the Legislature
has declared that the policy of Florida is to treat AIDS and the per-
ception of AIDS-related illnesses as protected handicaps. At the very
least, then, the 1989 Enactment contemplates that those who suffer
such discrimination can seek the remedies provided in each of the
handicap statutes discussed above, among others.
A. Remedies Created by Handicap Statutes
The remedies created by the handicap statutes vary considerably.
Some include direct court review and no restrictions on damages. A
217. FLA. STAT. § 110.105(2) (1989).
218. Id. § 110.233(1).
219. Id. § 112.042(1).
220. Id. § 112.042(2)(a).
221. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(4)(b)
(1989)).
222. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(3)(b) (1989)).
223. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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complaint filed under the Florida Constitution's handicap clause, for
instance, may be brought directly in court without apparent limitation
on the damages that may be recovered. 224 Likewise, the Emergency
Medical Services Act provides for direct judicial review, damages and
any other relief the court deems appropriate. 225
Other provisions, however, restrict damages in significant ways or
establish special reviewing procedures. The Educational Equity Act,
for instance, provides for direct judicial enforcement but limits the
remedy exclusively to equitable relief, reasonable attorney's fees, and
court costs for a prevailing party.2 26 The Human Rights Act and Fair
Housing Act require administrative review prior to judicial proceed-
ings and allow the recovery of some actual damages but not punitive
damages. 2 7 A claim of handicap discrimination by a local govern-
mental agency can proceed to court only after an appeal to an appro-
priate supervisory body, but is not otherwise restricted. 228
Still other handicap statutes appear to confine their remedies exclu-
sively to administrative procedures. For instance, the only apparent
means of enforcing the prohibition on handicap discrimination in
state-backed housing loans is through discretionary administrative
agency action.2 2 9 The same is true of a violation of the insurance sta-
tutes discussed above, 230 of laws prohibiting discrimination in the state
career service, 231 and of the statute governing handicap discrimination
in alcoholic beverage establishments. 2 2 In the absence of an agency's
willingness to act, the language of these particular handicap discrimi-
nation statutes provides no other remedy.
The question remaining, then, is whether the 1989 Enactment pro-
vides any other remedies. If it operates only as a simple statement of
public policy, the answer almost certainly is "no." There is every indi-
cation, however, that this is not the result the Legislature intended in
the case of AIDS-related discrimination.
224. See Schreiner v. McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc., 432 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1983), approving 408
So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972).
225. FLA. STAT. § 395.0142(5)(b) (1989).
226. Id. § 228.2001(8).
227. Compare id. §§ 760.10(10)-.10(13) (damages under Human Rights Act) with id. §§
760.34-.35 (damages under Fair Housing Act). See Bennet v. S. Marine Management Co., 531 F.
Supp 115, 116-17 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (no punitive damages under Human Rights Act).
228. Id. § 112.042(2)(b) (1989).
229. See id. § 420.605(6).
230. See id. §§ 627.644, 627.6576 & 627.6615.
231. Id. § 110.233(l).
232. See id. § 562.51.
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B. Remedies Created by the Omnibus AIDS Act
The 1989 Enactment is one of several parts of section 760.50, Flor-
ida Statutes, 233 which provides other remedies designed specifically for
those suffering from discrimination. 2 4 Section 760.50 originally was
created by the Omnibus AIDS Act, and it states in pertinent part that
"[any person aggrieved by a violation of this section shall have a
right of action in the circuit court .... ,,211 In lawsuits brought under
section 760.50, the recovery for each violation can include liquidated
or actual damages, 23 6 reasonable attorney's fees, 23 7 an injunction, 23 s
and any other relief the court deems appropriate, 23 9 including punitive
damages.24° Moreover, section 760.50 declares that "[n]othing in this
section limits the right of the person aggrieved by a violation of this
section to recover damages or other relief under any other applicable
law. ' 241 This statement indicates that the remedies provided here are
cumulative to all other remedies. 242
Two possible interpretations of the 1989 Enactment relate to the
remedies provided in section 760.50. First, it is possible to conclude
that the 1989 Enactment incorporates only the specific remedies avail-
able under other handicap law but not those independently available
under section 760.50. Under this interpretation, the 1989 Enactment
would be read as nothing but a statement of public policy, freestand-
ing and unrelated to section 760.50. As a result, the right of action
created by section 760.50 would not be available to those suffering
AIDS-related handicap discrimination, although such persons might
be entitled to relief under other provisions of the Omnibus AIDS
Act. 24
3
This restrictive construction, however, ignores the plain language of
section 760.50 as amended by the 1989 Enactment. The 1989 Enact-
ment does not stand alone; it is one of several related parts attached
233. Id. § 760.50.
234. Ch. 88-380, § 45, 1988 FLA. LAWS 1996, 2029-31 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50
(1989)).
235. FIA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(a) (1989)).
236. Id. Liquidated damages can be $1,000 for a violation or $5,000 for an intentional or
reckless violation of the statute. Id. §§ 760.50(6)(a)1, 2.
237. Id. § 7 60.50(6)(a)3.
238. Id. § 760.50(6)(a)4.
239. Id.
240. See 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 490.
241. FLA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(b) (1989)).
242. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 490.
243. See FIA. STAT. §§ 760.50(2)(a)-.50(4)(b) (Supp. 1988) (recodified as FLA. STAT. §§
760.50(3)(a)-.50(6)(b) (1989)).
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to the remedy section outlined above. This fact alone suggests the sec-
ond possible interpretation: that the remedies fashioned by the Omni-
bus AIDS Act and codified in section 760.50 were meant to be applied
to the 1989 Enactment. Denying plaintiffs the specific relief crafted by
the Legislature arguably violates the legislative intent.
The nature of the 1989 Enactment as remedial legislation, which
must be liberally construed to achieve its purpose, underscores this
conclusion. 2" In fact, as legislation advancing the welfare of society as
a whole,2 45 the 1989 Enactment is entitled to liberal construction even
though it imposes civil liabilities on individuals who breach its stan-
dards.246 By cloaking victims of AIDS-related discrimination with
"every protection made available to handicapped persons, ' 247 the
1989 Enactment could be strictly construed as extending only those
remedies available under any other handicap discrimination law. Yet,
the 1989 Enactment also can be liberally construed as providing dual
remedies: those available under the handicap law and those available
under section 760.50. Settled rules of statutory construction, which
require liberal construction in this instance, favor this interpretation.
So does the statutory language itself. The 1989 Enactment did not
subject AIDS-related discrimination merely to the remedies created by
other law. Rather, section 760.50 as amended by the 1989 Enactment
subjected such discrimination to "every protection made available to
handicapped persons. ' 248 After establishing the right to these protec-
tions, the statutory section created a new cause of action for "[a]ny
person aggrieved by a violation of this section ' 249 and declared that
this remedy is cumulative to all other remedies available under law.
2 10
Nothing in the statute purports to deny these other remedies to those
claiming a violation under the 1989 Enactment.
In the context of this language, the use of the word "protection"
can be read to suggest something broader than and apart from "rem-
edy." Specifically, a "protection" in this context is the legal right to
be free from certain conduct committed by other classes of persons.
244. The purpose is preventing the harm society suffers when AIDS-related discrimination
causes a loss of productivity and opportunity. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250
(codified at FLA.. STAT § 760.50(1) (1989)). For more extensive discussions and documentation of
this harm, see the books and articles cited infra note 264.
245. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
246. State v. Hamilton, 388 So. 2d 561, 563 (Fla. 1980) (quoting City of Miami Beach v.
Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1971)).
247. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 22-51 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)).
248. Id.
249. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(a)
(1989)).
250. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(b) (1989)).
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This right gives rise to a corresponding duty imposed upon these other
classes of persons. Unlike a "protection" provided by law, a "rem-
edy" does not concern the breach of a duty or the rights of an individ-
ual suffering discrimination; rather, a remedy is simply the legal
device for redress after breach has been established. "Protection,"
then, is a broader term than "remedy."
This distinction between the two terms supports the liberal con-
struction advanced in this Article. Specifically, the reference to "every
protection" need not be read as limiting remedies only to those availa-
ble under other handicap discrimination laws. Rather, the 1989 Enact-
ment can be interpreted as creating specific new rights for which new
remedies also were fashioned, with these new remedies being cumula-
tive to all others.
This conclusion is also supported by the 1989 Enactment's status as
a "reference statute.'' 251 As such, the statutory reference to "every
protection made available to handicapped persons' 25 2 literally incor-
porates all other handicap discrimination law. Accordingly, all other
handicap discrimination law now must be read as though incorporated
word-for-word into the 1989 Enactment, subject to the explicit reme-
dies provided in section 760.50.
C. Liberal v. Strict Construction
This Article does not suggest that this is the only reasonable inter-
pretation of the 1989 Enactment. Rather, it suggests that this is the
interpretation that must be accorded the 1989 Enactment under the
liberal construction required by Florida law. Undoubtedly, a reasona-
bly strict construction of the 1989 Enactment could hold it to be noth-
ing more than a statement of public policy that merely refines the
definition of "handicap." Yet, a reasonably liberal construction is
that the 1989 Enactment operates on two levels, both as a statement
of policy and as a direct incorporation of all other handicap law. The
settled rules of construction and the explicit statement of findings
adopted by the 1989 Legislature require the courts to favor the second
of these alternatives.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Under a liberal construction, the 1989 Enactment has three specific
effects. First, it equates the term "handicap" with AIDS, ARC, and
HIV infection, and the perception of any of these illnesses or infec-
251. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
252. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(2) (1989)).
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tions. The result is to give anyone suffering AIDS-related discrimina-
tion of whatever type the protections of all other Florida handicap
discrimination laws.
Second, the 1989 Enactment directly incorporates all of the existing
handicap discrimination laws into the nondiscrimination section of the
Omnibus AIDS Act. The result is that existing handicap discrimina-
tion laws will be treated as though they were word-for-word a part of
the AIDS section. In effect, all the rights, duties, and protections cre-
ated by other handicap discrimination law are incorporated into the
1989 Enactment. For this reason, the 1989 Enactment is a general
"reference statute" similar to other such statutes upheld as constitu-
tional by the Florida Supreme Court.253
Third, the 1989 Enactment and the section it amended create a new
statutory cause of action for violations of these rights and duties. This
remedy, which can include actual and punitive damages and reasona-
ble attorneys fees, 254 is expressly declared to be cumulative to all other
remedies. As a result, dual remedies will be available to persons suf-
fering handicap discrimination based on having or being perceived as
having AIDS, ARC, or HIV infection. Such persons will be able to
seek remedies under (1) any other handicap discrimination laws and
(2) under the 1989 Enactment and its related remedial provisions.
The duplication of remedies required by a liberal construction of
the 1989 Enactment may seem extraordinary. The 1989 Legislature,
however, gave explicit reasons why extraordinary remedies are
needed. After an intensive three-year review of AIDS-related issues in
Florida, the Florida House of Representatives' AIDS Task Force de-
termined that society itself is suffering serious harm because of AIDS
related discrimination. This harm occurs because "otherwise able-
bodied persons are deprived of the means of supporting themselves,
providing for their own health care, housing themselves, and partici-
pating in the opportunities otherwise available to them in society."2 55
The deprivation of these opportunities results in definite and provable
harm to society itself.256
The entire Legislature and the Governor concurred in this assess-
ment without a single dissenting voice. 57 The validity of this legisla-
253. See State v. J.R.M., 388 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (Fla. 1980); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla.
792, 808-09, 78 So. 693, 698 (1918); Jones v. Dexter, 8 Fla. 276 (1859), overruled on other
grounds, Bushnell v. Dennison, 13 Fla. 77 (1869).
254. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(6)(a)
(1989)).
255. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(l) (1989)).
256. Id.
257. See FLA. S. JOUR. 891 (June 2, 1989) (vote on CS for CS for HB 1590 (1989) was 35 to 0
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tive finding cannot be doubted. In the decade since AIDS first
emerged as a serious health threat, Florida has become one of three
states hardest hit by the epidemic. 28 Florida has witnessed virtual hys-
teria engulf some segments of its population. 2 9 The result has been a
kind of mindless bigotry unparalleled since the days when Florida was
racially segregated. Members of the Florida Legislature have repeat-
edly noted that the bigotry must end if the state is to deal effectively
with the epidemic. 260
Examples of the evils caused by this irrational fear are close at hand
in Florida. In one instance, three small schoolchildren were harassed,
their home was burned to the ground, and they finally were run out of
the small Florida town of Arcadia because they wanted to attend pub-
lic school. 261 In another instance, a 14-year-old Pensacola boy was
taken from his mother and "quarantined" in an isolation cell of a
county mental health hospital because a judge believed the boy to be
sexually promiscuous. 262 In yet another instance, a Fort Lauderdale
hospice for people with AIDS was repeatedly set afire, apparently be-
cause of the unknown arsonists' blind and groundless fear of AIDS.2 63
These are not isolated examples of the bigotry Florida must now
confront. Similar incidents have occurred countless times throughout
the state and the nation. 26 People have lost jobs, insurance coverage,
in the Senate); FLA. H.R. JoUR. 1698 (June 2, 1989) (vote on CS for CS for HB 1590 (1989) was
115 to 0 in House of Representatives). The Governor signed CS for HB 1590 into law on July 5,
1989. Ch. 89-350, 1989 Fla. Laws 2233, 2252 (date of Governor's signature).
258. 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 444 n.2.
259. Id. at 445-46 nn.8-12 and accompanying text.
260. R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 193-95 (reproducing Fla. H.R., Comm. on
Health Care, transcript of hearing (Apr. 13, 1988) (statement of Rep. Frankel)); id. at 395-96
(reproducing Fla. H.R., transcript of floor debate (May 10, 1988) (comments of Rep. Frankel)).
261. Rays Giving up, Leaving Town, Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Aug. 30, 1987, at IA, col 5;
see 1988 AIDS Article, supra note 2, at 446 n. 10 and accompanying text.
262. Quarantine Indication of "Hysteria, " Pensacola News J., June 12, 1987, at IA, col. 2.
263. Fire at AIDS Hospice Is Called Arson, St. Petersburg Times, June 15, 1989, at 12B,
col. 1.
264. See S. SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS (1989) (describing tendency of people to treat
AIDS irrationally as a symbol of moral and social pollution); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
ComISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VtRus EPmEMIC xviii (1988) ("Fear has led to
discrimination against persons known to be infected."); Fineberg, The Social Dimensions of
AIDS, Sci. AM., Oct. 1988, at 128 (people known to be infected have lost jobs, homes and
friends); Banks & McFadden, Rush to Judgement: HIV Test Reliability and Screening, 23 TULSA
L.J. 1, 1-2 nn.l & 4 (1987) (discussing moral indignation toward gay people associated with HIV
epidemic); Eisenberg, The Genesis of Fear: AIDS and the Public's Response to Science, 14 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 243, 245 (1986) (discussing problems caused by irrational fear of AIDS);
Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231, 235
(1986) (recounting early extreme repressive measures taken against people with AIDS); Note,
Characterization and Disease: Homosexuals and the Threat of AIDS, 66 N.C.L. REV. 226 (1987)
(discussing stigmatization of gay people because of AIDS). For a journalistic account of the
early hysteria and misinformation associated with the epidemic, see R. SHtrLGS, AND THE BAND
PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987).
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and access to resources usually available to the ill.265 Families have
been split and lives have been ruined. Otherwise healthy and produc-
tive people have suffered discrimination that robs them of the means
of caring for themselves. Those most in need of health care have been
turned into wards of the state, dependent upon charity that, in the
final analysis, usually is paid from public tax monies. 266
Unquestionably, these problems harm society as a whole. With
200,000 to 400,000 residents now believed to be infected, 267 Florida
could face staggering disruptions and enormous losses of productivity
if the events in Arcadia, Pensacola, and Fort Lauderdale were re-
peated every time a Floridian is believed to be infected. 268 The ultimate
cost of such discrimination is too high a price for society to pay.
This is the evil the 1988 and 1989 Legislatures sought to remedy. 269
Broad-based bigotry aimed at those believed to be infected required
broad-based remedies. By extending extraordinary remedies to those
who suffer AIDS-related discrimination, the Legislature has sought
not only to protect constitutional rights but also to prepare Florida
for the incredible toll AIDS will exact in the 1990s, barring a cure.270
Only in this way can Florida hope to combat the ill effects of AIDS.
Until the illness itself finally succumbs to medical science, having and
being perceived as having AIDS are handicaps protected by Florida
law.
265. See South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 3d DCA
1985), approved, 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987) ("AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to dis-
crimination in employment, education, housing and even medical treatment").
266. E.g., R.C. WATERS, supra note 1, app. A at 280 (1989) (reproducing Fla. H.R., Comm.
on Health Care, transcript of hearing (Apr. 28, 1988) (statement of Gary Clarke) (approximately
60 percent of AIDS-related debts at Florida's largest treatment facility, Jackson Memorial Hos-
pital, are ultimately paid from public resources).
267. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
268. The 1989 Legislature made an explicit finding to this effect. Ch. 89-350, § 14, 1989 Fla.
Laws 2233, 2250 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 760.50(1) (1989)).
269. Id.
270. See id.
